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Abstract  This  paper  explores  the  relationship  between  productivity  and  sourcing  strategies
using a  sample  of  Spanish  manufacturing  ﬁrms.  In  this  analysis  we  use  different  measures  of
productivity  and  alternative  ways  of  grouping  ﬁrms.  Our  results  indicate  that  productivity  dif-
fers systematically  across  groups  of  ﬁrms  with  different  sourcing  strategies.  The  ranking  of
productivities  we  observe  is  not  fully  consistent  with  the  predictions  of  Antràs  and  Helpman’s
(2004) model  but  we  conﬁrm  many  partial  aspects  of  the  proposed  ranking.  In  our  preferred
speciﬁcations,  the  productivity  advantage  is  highest  for  ﬁrms  that  import  inputs  from  foreign
subsidiaries.  Moreover,  the  group  of  ﬁrms  that  outsource  in  the  domestic  market  is,  in  gen-
eral, at  the  bottom  of  the  productivity  distribution,  with  ﬁrms  that  outsource  abroad  having  an
intermediate  productivity  advantage.  When  analysing  the  direction  of  causality  between  pro-
ductivity and  sourcing  strategies,  we  ﬁnd  weak  evidence  of  self-selection  of  ﬁrms  into  offshoringSelf-selection and no  inﬂuence  of  relocation  on  ﬁrm  productivity.
© 2015  ACEDE.  Published  by  Elsevier  España,  S.L.U.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
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oreign  sourcing  has  grown  in  prominence  in  recent  decades
s  a  major  international  ﬁrm  activity.  Underlying  this
henomenon  is  the  growing  fragmentation  of  production
rocesses  across  ﬁrms  and  countries,  which  has  led  to
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teadily  increasing  shares  of  intermediate  inputs  in  total
rade.
The  choices  faced  by  a  ﬁrm  which  needs  an  interme-
iate  input  can  be  represented  by  four  different  sourcing
ptions.  First,  the  ﬁrm  can  decide  to  keep  the  process  within
ts  boundaries  or  to  contract  it  externally  to  a non-related
arty.  Second,  the  ﬁrm  can  decide  to  locate  the  process
ither  in  the  domestic  market  or  abroad.  The  combina-
ion  of  these  choices  yields  four  options.  The  intermediate
nput  can  be  subcontracted  at  home  (domestic  outsourc-
ng),  subcontracted  to  an  external  supplier  abroad  (foreign
utsourcing),  integrated  within  the  boundaries  of  the  ﬁrm
t  home  (domestic  integration)  and  integrated  abroad  (for-
ign  integration).  This  classiﬁcation  has  been  proposed  by
is is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
anu
g
a
o
ﬁ
t
g
e
s
i
o
o
w
d
t
s
o
(
d
c
o
p
t
s
s
t
t
a
r
n
l
f
m
s
t
p
a
t
c
g
a
r
v
t
t
o
F
s
T
T
m
i
tSourcing  strategies  and  productivity:  evidence  for  Spanish  m
Feenstra  (2010)  and  Helpman  (2011),  among  many  others,
and  extensively  used  to  describe  the  sourcing  strategies  of
ﬁrms  at  home  and  abroad.
Several  theoretical  models  have  been  suggested  to  inves-
tigate  the  organizational  choices  of  ﬁrms.  An  approach
based  on  the  theory  of  property  rights  to  the  ﬁrm  with
incomplete  contracts  has  been  proposed  by  Grossman  and
Helpman  (2002),  Antràs  (2003)  and  Antràs  and  Helpman
(2004)  (see  a  recent  review  of  this  literature  by  Antràs,
2014).  In  this  setting,  companies  make  two  endogenous
organizational  choices,  an  integration  decision  and  a  loca-
tion  decision,  and  the  model  shows  how  a  ﬁrm’s  decisions
to  integrate  or  to  outsource  are  a  consequence  of  the
level  of  ﬁrm  technology.  The  prevalence  of  one  way  over
the  other  to  organize  the  production  (integrate  vs.  out-
source;  outsource  in  the  domestic  market  vs.  outsource
abroad)  depends  on  the  distribution  of  productivity  across
ﬁrms  within  an  industry.  A  second  approach,  proposed  by
Grossman  and  Helpman  (2004),  who  model  input  sourcing  in
a  principal-agent  framework,  suggests  a  different  relation-
ship  between  organizational  mode  and  productivity  at  the
ﬁrm  level.
There  is  an  empirical  literature  using  ﬁrm-level  data
that  have  explored  the  relationship  between  input  sourc-
ing  and  productivity.  Our  paper  is  related  to  this  literature.
Tomiura  (2007)  analyses  the  choices  between  foreign  out-
sourcing  and  FDI  for  Japanese  manufacturing  ﬁrms.  Choices
of  organizational  form  follow  a  productivity  ordering  which
is  consistent  with  Antràs  and  Helpman  (2004).  Most  produc-
tive  ﬁrms  engage  in  FDI  and  less  productive  ﬁrms  choose
foreign  outsourcing.  Federico  (2010)  estimates  sourcing  pre-
mia  for  Italian  manufacturing  ﬁrms.  There  is  a  productivity
ordering  by  which  ﬁrms  integrating  abroad  are  the  most  pro-
ductive  ones,  and  domestic  outsourcing  ﬁrms  are  the  least
productive  ones.  However,  in  contrast  to  the  assumptions
of  Antràs  and  Helpman’s  (2004)  model,  foreign  outsourc-
ing  ﬁrms  are  less  productive  than  ﬁrms  that  integrate  at
home.  Kohler  and  Smolka  (2011)  estimate  the  productivity
premia  for  every  organizational  form  relative  to  domestic
outsourcing  for  a  sample  of  Spanish  manufacturing  ﬁrms.
The  productivity  advantage  is  highest  for  ﬁrms  that  import
inputs  from  foreign  subsidiaries  and  lowest  for  ﬁrms  out-
sourcing  at  home.  The  productivity  difference  between  ﬁrms
that  integrate  at  home  and  ﬁrms  performing  outsourcing
abroad  are  not  statistically  signiﬁcant.  Defever  and  Toubal
(2013)  examine  French  multinationals.  They  ﬁnd  that  the
least  productive  ﬁrms  are  multinationals  that  produce  their
intermediate  inputs  in  foreign  subsidiaries  while  the  most
productive  outsource  abroad.
This  paper  explores  the  relationship  between  a  ﬁrm’s
sourcing  decisions  and  productivity.  This  issue  is  addressed
empirically  using  a  sample  of  Spanish  manufacturing  ﬁrms.
Our  dataset  provides  detailed  ﬁrm-level  information  based
on  a  survey  where  ﬁrms  report  how  they  acquire  intermedi-
ate  inputs  in  each  of  the  four  theoretical  modes.  A  second
characteristic  of  the  dataset  is  that  the  information  the  ﬁrm
provides  refers  to  intermediate  inputs  that  are  acquired
within  a  bilateral  relationship  that  implies  speciﬁc  invest-
ments  in  such  a  way  that  the  goods  and  services  produced
are  tailored  to  the  needs  of  the  ﬁrm.  Therefore,  our  measure
of  sourcing  does  not  refer  to  a  simple  purchase  of  interme-
diate  inputs  consisting  of  raw  materials  and  standardized
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oods.  It  rather  refers  to  inputs  that  are  produced  within
 ‘‘subcontracting’’  relationship.  The  third  characteristic
f  the  dataset  used  is  that  it  is  an  unbalanced  panel  of
rms  from  1990  to  2005.  This  structure  allows  us  to  observe
he  transition  ﬁrms  make  between  different  sourcing  strate-
ies.  For  example,  we  are  able  to  observe  cohorts  of  ﬁrms
stablishing  a  stable  relationship  with  a  foreign  supplier  (off-
horing)  for  the  ﬁrst  time.
The  paper  contributes  to  the  literature,  ﬁrst,  by  provid-
ng  a  number  of  stylized  facts  related  to  the  heterogeneity
f  sourcing  decisions  by  Spanish  manufacturing  ﬁrms.  Sec-
nd,  we  estimate  productivity  premia  for  groups  of  ﬁrms
ith  different  sourcing  strategies.  The  estimation  of  pro-
uctivity  premia  permits  us  to  check  whether  they  conform
o  the  sorting  of  productivities  predicted  by  models  of  global
ourcing.  We  pay  particular  attention  to  the  predictions
f  Grossman  and  Helpman  (2004)  and  Antràs  and  Helpman
2004).  Third,  the  pattern  of  correlation  between  ﬁrm  pro-
uctivity  and  sourcing  decisions  does  not  imply  any  kind  of
ausality  running  from  sourcing  to  the  productivity  level
f  the  ﬁrm.  However,  the  panel-structure  of  our  dataset
ermits  us  to  perform  some  basic  descriptive  regressions
hat  can  be  interpreted  in  terms  of  alternative  hypothe-
es  concerning  the  direction  of  causality  between  sourcing
trategies  and  ﬁrm  productivity.  In  particular,  we  test  for
he  selection  hypothesis  (i.e.,  whether  ﬁrms  self-select  into
heir  sourcing  strategy  as  the  theoretical  models  suggests)
nd  for  the  relocation  hypothesis  (i.e.,  ﬁrms’  decisions  to
elocate  some  stages  of  their  production  process  to  exter-
al  suppliers  result  in  a  positive  impact  on  the  productivity
evel  of  these  ﬁrms).
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  ‘Theoretical
ramework  and  related  literature’  provides  a review  of  the
ain  characteristics  of  the  theoretical  literature  of  global
ourcing.  Section  ‘Data  and  descriptive  evidence’  describes
he  characteristics  of  the  data  set  used  in  the  analysis  and
resents  some  basic  descriptive  evidence  on  the  magnitude
nd  evolution  of  sourcing.  Section  ‘Sourcing  strategies  and
he  pattern  of  ﬁrm  productivities’  introduces  the  empiri-
al  approach,  presents  the  sorting  of  productivities  across
roups  of  ﬁrms  with  different  patterns  in  their  sourcing
ctivity  and  offers  some  robustness  checks  of  the  main
esults.  Section  ‘Offshoring  and  ﬁrm  productivity:  selection
s.  relocation’  takes  ﬁrms  with  different  transition  pat-
erns  in  their  sourcing  strategies  as  a reference  to  test  for
wo  alternative  hypotheses  of  the  superior  performance  of
ffshoring  (foreign  integration  and/or  foreign  outsourcing).
inally,  Section  ‘Conclusions’  summarizes  the  main  conclu-
ions.
heoretical framework and related literature
o  organize  our  empirical  work,  this  section  brieﬂy  sum-
arizes  the  predictions  of  theories  on  the  choice  between
ntegration  and  outsourcing.
Most  models  of  global  sourcing  assume  the  existence  of
wo  forms  of  organizational  choice:  vertical  integration,  or
he  provision  of  inputs  within  the  boundaries  of  the  ﬁrm,  and
utsourcing  or  provision  through  an  independent  supplier.
here  is  a  basic  trade-off  between  integration  and  outsourc-
ng.  Integration  has  the  advantage  of  a  greater  control  over
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he  supply  of  inputs,  but  might  have  negative  consequences
y  weakening  the  incentive  to  work  hard  in  producing  high-
uality  inputs.  Therefore,  when  the  costs  of  internalization
re  signiﬁcant,  outsourcing  may  be  a  better  strategy  for  the
nal  goods  producer.  The  theoretical  literature  suggests  that
his  choice  between  vertical  integration  and  outsourcing  is
nﬂuenced  by  the  level  of  ﬁrm  productivity.
We  ﬁrst  refer  to  two  papers,  Antràs  (2003)  and  Antràs
nd  Helpman  (2004),  which  are  based  on  the  property  right
pproach  with  incomplete  contracts  developed  by  Grossman
nd  Hart  (1986).  Both  focus  on  a  holdup-problem  arising
ith  incomplete  contracts  and  a  relationship  that  involves
peciﬁc  inputs.
Antràs  (2003)  considers  two  agents  engaged  in  pro-
uction:  a  ﬁnal  good  producer  who  supplies  headquarter
ervices  and  produces  the  ﬁnal  good,  and  a  manufacturing
rm  which  supplies  an  intermediate  input  that  is  required  for
he  production  of  the  ﬁnal  good.  Both  inputs  --  headquarter
ervices  and  intermediate  inputs  --  are  tailored  speciﬁcally
o  the  production  of  the  ﬁnal  good.  From  the  point  of  view
f  the  decision  to  integrate  or  to  outsource  intermediate
nputs,  the  basic  result  of  the  model  is  the  existence  of
 unique  threshold  such  that  when  the  production  of  the
nal  good  is  intensive  in  headquarter  services,  integration
ominates  outsourcing,  while  for  a  situation  where  the  pro-
uction  of  the  ﬁnal  good  is  more  intensive  in  intermediate
nputs,  outsourcing  does  a  better  job.
Antràs  and  Helpman  (2004)  integrate  the  previous  frame-
ork  in  a  world  of  two  countries,  where  the  production
f  the  ﬁnal  good  combines  intermediate  inputs  and  head-
uarter  services,  sectors  differ  in  relative  input  intensity
nd  ﬁrms  within  sectors  differ  in  their  productivity  level.
n  this  setting,  ﬁrms  make  two  endogenous  organizational
hoices.  The  ﬁrst  one  concerns  the  ownership  structure  of
he  ﬁrm,  which  can  decide  to  integrate  the  activity  within
ts  boundaries  or  not.  The  second  one  refers  to  the  location
ecision  for  ﬁrms  producing  intermediate  inputs,  which  can
e  located  at  home  or  abroad.  The  production  of  the  ﬁnal
ood  only  takes  place  in  the  domestic  market.  Therefore,
oncerning  the  supply  decisions  of  intermediate  inputs  for
rms  producing  ﬁnal  goods,  they  have  four  different  strate-
ies:  domestic  integration  (DI),  domestic  outsourcing  (DO),
oreign  integration  (FI)  and  foreign  outsourcing  (FO).
Firms  located  in  a  foreign  market  beneﬁt  from  lower  rel-
tive  variable  costs  but  they  face  higher  ﬁxed  organizational
osts  of  search,  monitoring  and  communication.  Concerning
he  decision  to  integrate  or  to  outsource,  the  result  of  Antràs
2003)  applies:  integration  does  a  better  job  for  efﬁciency
hen  the  relative  intensity  of  headquarter  services  is  high.
Fixed  organizational  costs  are  ranked  as  follows:  f(FI)  >
(FO)  >  f(DI)  >  f(DO),  which  says  that  regardless  of  the
wnership  structure  of  the  ﬁrms,  ﬁxed  costs  are  higher  in
he  foreign  market.  The  ﬁxed  costs  of  integrating  or  out-
ourcing  abroad,  f(FI)  and  f(FO),  respectively,  are  higher
han  the  costs  of  integrating  or  outsourcing  at  home,  f(DI)
nd  f(DO),  respectively.  Furthermore,  for  a  given  location,
xed  costs  of  a  ﬁrm  integrating  the  production  of  intermedi-
te  inputs  are  higher  than  the  ﬁxed  costs  of  an  outsourcing
rm.  With  respect  to  this  latter  assumption,  on  one  hand
he  integration  of  the  production  of  components  implies
dditional  supervision  costs,  and  on  the  other  hand  inte-
ration  might  beneﬁt  from  managerial  economies  of  scope.
d
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ntràs  and  Helpman  (2004)  assume  that  additional  super-
ision  costs  associated  with  integration  are  higher  than
otential  economies  of  scope  that  may  reduce  the  costs  of
ntegration  relative  to  outsourcing.  Overall,  the  ranking  of
xed  costs  is  as  in  the  expression  above.
The  industry  equilibrium  predictions  coming  out  of  the
odel  indicate  that  the  location  and  integration  decisions
ill  depend  on  both  the  level  of  ﬁrm  productivity  ()  and
he  relative  input  intensity  of  the  industry.  The  pattern
f  results  can  be  summarized  as  follows  for  headquarter-
ntensive  industries.  Firms  decide  to  integrate  or  not  and
o  locate  abroad  or  not  according  to  the  following  criteria:
(DO)  <  (DI)  <  (FO)  <  (FI).  Firms  with  the  highest  level  of
roductivity,  (FI),  integrate  the  production  of  intermediate
nputs  in  a  foreign  country  (intra-ﬁrm  trade).  The  next  group
orresponds  to  ﬁrms  with  a  lower  productivity  level,  (FO),
hich  outsource  in  the  foreign  market  (arm’s  length  trade).
irms  with  a  lower  intermediate  level  of  productivity  inte-
rate  at  home  (DI).  Finally,  the  group  with  the  lowest  level
f  productivity  corresponds  to  domestic  outsourcing  ﬁrms
(DO).
The  model  by  Grossman  and  Helpman  (2004)  represents
 second  and  different  strand  of  this  literature  concerned
ith  the  international  organization  of  production.  In  this
etting,  there  is  a  different  and  more  complex  relationship
etween  organizational  form  and  productivity.  The  approach
n  this  model  is  slightly  different  from  the  property  rights
pproach  of  Antràs  and  Helpman  (2004). Grossman  and
elpman  (2004)  put  forth  a managerial  incentives  model  of
nternational  organization  of  production.  The  model  ﬁnds
hat  foreign  outsourcing  is  chosen  by  the  most  productive
nd  the  least  productive  ﬁrms,  while  intermediate  produc-
ivity  ﬁrms  choose  to  integrate.
Given  the  extent  to  which  the  various  assumptions  and
odels  put  forth  by  the  theory  of  international  organization
f  production  differ  in  their  predictions,  empirical  evidence
s  an  obvious  strategy  for  discriminating  between  them.  The
est  of  the  paper  is  devoted  to  this  objective.
ata and descriptive evidence
his  section  describes  the  main  characteristics  of  the
ataset  used  in  the  analysis  and  presents  some  basic  descrip-
ive  evidence  on  the  magnitude  and  evolution  of  sourcing
trategies  by  ﬁrms.  This  information  is  completed  in  the  next
ection  with  a more  in-depth  analysis  of  the  differences  in
erformance  between  ﬁrms  that  are  classiﬁed  according  to
he  choice  of  sourcing  strategies  they  make.
We  employ  a longitudinal  set  of  Spanish  manufacturing
rms  taken  from  the  Encuesta  sobre  Estrategias  Empresar-
ales  (ESEE).  The  database  contains  a  longitudinal  sample
f  ﬁrms  from  1990  to  2005.  The  sample  of  ﬁrms  used  in
his  section  is  a  panel  of  ﬁrms  that  contains  20,113  obser-
ations  corresponding  to  an  average  number  of  1,359  ﬁrms
er  year.  The  ﬁnal  sample  is  an  unbalanced  panel  of  ﬁrms
hat  is  representative  of  the  population  of  Spanish  manufac-
uring  ﬁrms  (see  Farin˜as and  Jaumandreu  (1999)  for  more
etails  on  the  characteristics  of  this  data  set;  Delgado  et  al.
2002), Farin˜as and  Martín-Marcos  (2007,  2010),  and  Merino
nd  Rodríguez  (2007)  are  examples  of  applications  using  the
SEE).
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Table  1  Extensive  margin  of  sourcing  strategies  (average
percentages  of  ﬁrms).
Sourcing
strategies
Firms  with
≤200
employees
Firms  with
>200
employees
All  ﬁrms
DO  16.6  2.2  12.4
FO 0.0  0.0  0.0
FI 0.0  0.0  0.0
DOFO 17.9  34.5  22.8
DOFI 0.5  1.7  0.8
FOFI 0.0  0.0  0.0
DOFOFI 2.0  12.4  5.1
DI 63.0  49.2  58.9
Number  of
observations
14,197  5,939  20,136
Note: Sourcing strategies are represented as DO (domestic out-
sourcing), FO (foreign outsourcing), FI (foreign integration) as
well as the combination of these strategies. DI corresponds to
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The  measures  of  domestic  and  foreign  sourcing  are  based
on  information  reported  directly  by  the  ﬁrm  in  the  sur-
vey.  This  information  indicates  whether  or  not  the  ﬁrm
subcontracts  some  parts  of  its  production  process  to  exter-
nal  suppliers.  In  particular,  ﬁrms  report  the  value  of  their
purchases  of  products  and  customized  components  subcon-
tracted  to  external  suppliers.  To  avoid  ambiguity,  we  list
the  question  to  which  ﬁrms  were  responding  in  the  ques-
tionnaire.  Firms  should  provide  the  ‘‘value  of  purchased
products  and  components  subcontracted  to  external  sup-
pliers  and  tailored  to  the  needs  of  the  ﬁrm  (the  ﬁrm  can
indicate  whether  it  also  provides  some  materials  to  the  sup-
plier)’’.
The  survey  provides  information  on  the  total  amount  of
subcontracted  purchases  of  intermediate  inputs  as  well  as
information  which  permit  to  estimate  the  value  of  these
purchases  that  comes  from  suppliers  located  in  the  domes-
tic  market  and  the  value  that  comes  from  purchases  from
suppliers  located  abroad.  Furthermore,  the  survey  provides
additional  information  to  compute  the  extent  to  which  the
amount  of  intermediate  inputs  subcontracted  abroad  comes
from  a  related  party  or  an  unrelated  party.
As  we  mention  in  the  introduction,  one  characteristic  of
the  dataset  used  is  that  the  information  the  ﬁrm  provides
refers  to  intermediate  inputs  acquired  within  a  bilateral
relationship.  These  inputs  are  tailored  to  the  needs  of  the
ﬁrm.  Our  analysis  does  not  simply  refer  to  how  ﬁrms  acquire
their  intermediate  inputs  but  to  how  ﬁrms  acquire  their  cus-
tomized  intermediate  inputs.  The  rest  of  the  paper  deals
with  this  kind  of  transactions,  which  ﬁts  quite  well  with
the  theoretical  literature  on  global  sourcing  summarized  in
‘Theoretical  framework  and  related  literature’  section.
Although  there  is  not  a  commonly  accepted  terminology
(see  Crinò,  2009),  we  use  the  term  ‘‘domestic  outsourc-
ing’’  (DO)  to  refer  to  the  activity  of  ﬁrms  which  subcontract
some  stages  of  their  production  process  to  external  suppli-
ers  which  are  located  in  the  domestic  market.  The  term
‘‘foreign  outsourcing’’  (FO)  refers  to  ﬁrms  that  subcon-
tract  to  external  unafﬁliated  suppliers  that  are  located  in
a  foreign  market.  And,  ﬁnally,  we  assign  the  term  ‘‘foreign
integration’’  (FI)  to  those  ﬁrms  that  subcontract  abroad
with  an  afﬁliated  company.  Antràs  and  Helpman  (2004)  and
Helpman  (2006)  use  the  term  ‘‘intra-ﬁrm  trade’’  to  refer  to
FI  and  the  term  ‘‘arm’s-length  trade’’  to  refer  to  FO.  A  sim-
ilar  use  of  the  three  terms  (DO,  FO  and  FI)  can  be  found  in
Olsen  (2006)  and  Feenstra  (2010).  The  term  ‘‘offshoring’’
is  frequently  used  to  refer  to  the  sourcing  of  a  good  or
service  in  a  foreign  country,  either  from  an  afﬁliated  (FI)
or  an  unafﬁliated  supplier  (FO);  see  Helpman  (2011).
According  to  previous  information,  we  are  able  to  classify
ﬁrms  into  the  following  groups  from  the  point  of  view  of  their
outsourcing  activities:
(1)  Firms  that  outsource  at  home  (DO)
(2)  Firms  that  outsource  abroad  from  unafﬁliated  suppliers
(FO)
(3)  Firms  that  outsource  abroad  from  afﬁliated  suppliers
(FI)As  a  matter  of  fact,  a  fourth  organizational  form  emerges
from  our  dataset,  i.e.,  the  group  of  ﬁrms  that  neither  out-
sources  at  home  nor  offshores  abroad.  We  can  classify  this
s
T
ﬁ
fdomestic integration, i.e. ﬁrms that do not perform any of the
three previous strategies.
roup  of  ﬁrms  as  non-sourcing  ﬁrms  or,  alternatively,  con-
ider  that  they  integrate  in  the  domestic  market  given  that
ll  transactions  occur  within  the  ﬁrm  in  the  domestic  mar-
et.  For  the  moment,  we  think  it  is  preferable  to  consider
hem  a  fourth  organizational  form.  However,  in  the  next
ection,  as  a  robust  test  for  the  comparisons  of  different
roups  of  ﬁrms,  we  consider  these  ﬁrms  a  special  group  of
on-sourcing  units.  Therefore,  we  deﬁne  a  fourth  group:
4)  Firms  that  integrate  at  home  (DI)
After  the  deﬁnition  of  groups  of  ﬁrms  to  be  considered,
e  begin  by  presenting  some  basic  empirical  regularities
oncerning  both  the  level  and  the  evolution  of  sourc-
ng  strategies  over  the  period  1990--2005.  We  are  able  to
dentify  eight  different  strategies.  Table  1  reports  the  per-
entage  share  of  ﬁrms  performing  these  strategies.  Four  of
hem  are  single  mode  strategies  (by  slight  abuse  of  nota-
ion,  we  denote  these  strategies  by  DO,  FO,  FI,  and  DI),
nd  the  rest  corresponds  to  mixed  combinations  of  the  sin-
le  mode  strategies  involving  outsourcing  at  home  and/or
broad  (denoted  by  DOFO,  DOFI,  FOFI,  and  DOFOFI).  In  what
ollows  we  establish  some  stylized  facts  that  can  be  drawn
rom  our  data  set.
First,  pure  integration  at  home  (DI)  is  quite  common.
bout  58.9%  of  the  ﬁrms  do  not  report  subcontracting
ny  intermediate  input  to  external  suppliers,  either  in  the
omestic  market  (DO)  or  abroad  (FO  and  FI).  Such  ﬁrms
ppear  to  be  pursuing  a  deep  vertical  integration  strategy
n  the  home  market.  This  integration  at  home  is  more  inten-
ive  for  small-medium  ﬁrms  relative  to  large  ones,  which  rely
ore  on  outsourcing  and  integration  in  foreign  markets.
Second,  excluding  DI  ﬁrms,  for  the  rest  of  the  ﬁrms,
ombined  strategies  are  more  prevalent  than  single  organi-
ational  forms.  About  28.7%  of  the  ﬁrms  follow  a  combined
trategy  while  only  12.4%  of  them  follow  a  pure  strategy.
his  regularity  is  more  pronounced  for  the  group  of  large
rms  where  48.6%  follow  a  combined  strategy  against  a  small
raction,  2.2%,  which  follow  a  pure  strategy.
9 J.C.  Farin˜as et  al.
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Third,  excluding  DI  ﬁrms  and  considering  that  the  rest
f  sourcing  strategies  are  not  mutually  exclusive,  domestic
utsourcing  is  more  common  than  foreign  sourcing  inde-
endently  of  ﬁrm  size.  However,  the  gap  between  both
trategies  is  larger  for  small-medium  ﬁrms.  Thirty-seven
ercent  of  small-medium  ﬁrms  perform  domestic  outsourc-
ng  (sometimes  in  combination  with  foreign  sourcing),  while
nly  19.9%  of  them  perform  foreign  sourcing  (sometimes
n  combination  with  domestic  outsourcing).  For  large  ﬁrms,
hese  percentages  are  50.8%  and  46.9,  respectively.
Fourth,  concerning  the  size  of  the  ﬁrm,  there  is  a  pos-
tive  relationship  between  the  probability  of  performing
utsourcing  either  at  home  or  abroad  and  the  size  of  the
rm.  Similarly,  there  is  a  positive  relationship  between
oreign  integration  and  size.  In  general  terms,  the  associ-
tion  is  stronger  for  foreign  outsourcing/integration  than
or  domestic  outsourcing.  This  suggests  that  performing
his  activity  involves  signiﬁcant  ﬁxed  costs  for  the  ﬁrm
nd,  consequently,  larger  ones  are  in  better  conditions  to
utsource/integrate  abroad.  Furthermore,  after  condition-
ng  on  both  strategies,  there  is  no  signiﬁcant  relationship
etween  the  intensity  of  these  activities  and  the  size  of  the
rm.
Fifth,  Table  2  reports  the  magnitude  of  the  intensive  mar-
ins  for  the  seven  groups  of  ﬁrms  considered.  These  margins
how  the  magnitude  of  domestic  outsourcing,  foreign  out-
ourcing  and  foreign  integration  in  terms  of  the  total  value
f  intermediate  inputs.  When  they  are  aggregated  for  the
ame  group  of  ﬁrms,  they  give  the  proportion  of  subcon-
racted  customized  intermediate  inputs  relative  to  the  value
f  intermediate  inputs  purchased  by  the  ﬁrm.  Two  regular-
ties  emerge  from  the  data:  (1)  domestic  outsourcing  has
lways  the  highest  intensity  for  all  groups  of  ﬁrms  and  (2)
he  average  value  of  these  intensive  margins  is  quite  similar
cross  ﬁrms  of  different  size  classes.
The  evolution  of  sourcing  strategies  is  reported  in
igs.  1  and  2.  There  is  no  clear  and  explicit  tendency  over  the
eriod  for  both  the  extensive  and  the  intensive  margins  of
omestic  outsourcing.  The  extensive  margin,  i.e.,  the  pro-
ortion  of  ﬁrms  performing  this  activity,  ﬂuctuates  around
0%.  The  intensive  margin,  conditional  on  the  group  of  ﬁrms
erforming  this  activity,  shows  the  magnitude  of  domestic
utsourcing  relative  to  the  value  of  intermediate  inputs.  It
uctuates  around  14%  over  the  years  with  a  slight  reduction
t  the  end  of  the  period.
Furthermore,  Fig.  1  shows  a  slight  increase  in  the  pro-
ortion  of  ﬁrms  that  perform  foreign  outsourcing  over  the
eriod  1990--2005.  Although  there  is  a  reduction  in  the  years
003  and  2004,  the  extensive  margin  increases  from  25.2%
n  1990  to  28.9%  in  2005.  A  similar  pattern  can  be  found  for
he  intensity  of  foreign  outsourcing  (see  Fig.  2):  at  the  begin-
ing  of  the  period,  intermediate  inputs  subcontracted  from
broad  represented  2.9%  of  the  total  purchase  of  interme-
iate  inputs,  and  at  the  end  of  the  period,  the  magnitude
eached  the  level  of  5.9%.  Therefore,  foreign  outsourcing
as  expanded  through  two  channels:  the  participation  rate
as  increased  and  so  has  the  intensity  of  this  activity  within
he  group  of  ﬁrms  that  outsource  abroad.Distinguishing  between  the  group  of  ﬁrms  that  perform
ffshoring  with  a  related  party  and  ﬁrms  that  use  channels
xternal  to  the  ﬁrm,  we  observe  a  large  difference  in  the
agnitude  of  the  extensive  margin  between  both  groups
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of  ﬁrms.  At  the  end  of  the  period,  only  6%  of  the  ﬁrms
perform  offshoring  via  intra-ﬁrm  trade,  i.e.,  foreign  inte-
gration,  while  28.9%  of  the  ﬁrms  in  the  sample  perform
offshoring  via  transactions  with  non-related  parties.  In  addi-
tion,  the  extensive  margin  of  offshoring  via  afﬁliated  parties
diminishes  slightly  over  the  period,  whereas  offshoring  with
non-afﬁliated  suppliers  has  increased  signiﬁcantly  over  the
period.  The  intensive  margins  of  offshoring  performed  with
either  non-afﬁliated  or  afﬁliated  suppliers  show  a  continu-
ous  and  systematic  increase  throughout  the  period.
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Figure  2  Average  intensive  margin  evolution  for  different  sourcing  
of total  intermediate  inputs  at  the  ﬁrm  level;  only  for  those  ﬁrms  peategies  over  the  period  1990--2005.  (percentage  of  ﬁrms).
ourcing strategies and the pattern of ﬁrm
roductivities
n  this  section  we  present  an  econometric  analysis  of  the
elationship  between  a  ﬁrm’s  productivity  and  its  sourcing
ehaviour.  The  aim  of  this  analysis  is  to  determine  whether
here  are  systematic  productivity  differences  among
rms  according  to  their  sourcing  strategy.  Therefore,  the
esults  in  this  section  should  be  interpreted  as  correlations
ather  than  causal  relationships.  Section  ‘Offshoring  and
20052004200320022001200019998
tegration Foreign outsourcing
strategies.  (Subcontracted  inputs  are  expressed  as  a  percentage
rforming  these  strategies).
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rm  productivity: selection  vs.  relocation’  presents  two
ttempts  at  identifying  the  direction  of  causality.
We  follow  the  methodology  proposed  by  Bernard  and
ensen  (1999)  and  many  subsequent  papers  to  estimate
xporter  premia.  A  similar  methodology  has  been  applied  by
ederico  (2010)  and  Kohler  and  Smolka  (2011)  to  estimate
ourcing  premia.  Such  premia  are  suggested  by  models  sum-
arized  in  ‘Theoretical  framework  and  related  literature’
ection.  According  to  these  models,  a  ﬁrm’s  productivity
evel  is  an  important  determinant  of  sourcing  decisions  by
rms.  Therefore,  we  should  expect  that  sourcing  organi-
ational  forms  follow  a  productivity  ordering  which  may
iffer  according  to  different  models  of  sourcing  behaviour  by
rms.
Before  presenting  our  results,  it  is  worthy  of  explaining
n  detail  what  are  the  main  differences  between  our  analysis
nd  Kohler  and  Smolka  (2011).  This  is  helpful  to  further  make
lear  the  contributions  of  our  paper.
First,  both  papers  use  the  same  dataset:  the  ESEE.  How-
ver,  our  analysis  is  based  on  a  question  to  which  ﬁrms
ere  responding  in  the  ESEE  questionnaire  during  the  period
990--2005.  This  question  disappears  from  the  questionnaire
n  2006.  Kohler  and  Smolka  (2011)  use  two  different  ques-
ions  that  were  introduced  from  2006  to  2008,  which  is  the
ime  period  they  consider.  Therefore,  the  information  used
n  both  articles  is  different.
Second,  Section  ‘Data  and  descriptive  evidence’  includes
he  question  that  is  used  in  this  paper.  It  refers  to  the  amount
f  purchases  of  goods  ‘‘subcontracted  to  external  suppli-
rs  and  tailored  to  the  needs  of  the  ﬁrm’’  The  questions
hat  are  used  by  Kohler  and  Smolka  (2011)  read  quite  differ-
ntly:  it  refers  to  the  ‘‘purchase  of  goods  and  services  that
he  ﬁrm  incorporates  to  the  production  process’’,  coming
ither  from  the  domestic  market  or  from  foreign  markets.
oth  questions  are  different  from  the  one  we  use.  As  we
ention  in  the  introduction,  our  measure  of  sourcing  refers
o  a  bilateral  relationship  that  requires  speciﬁc  investments
y  the  supplier  as  he  has  to  tailor  the  good  supplied  to
he  needs  of  the  ﬁrm.  In  general  terms,  we  think  that  our
easure  ﬁts  better  to  the  models  we  take  as  reference  to
xplore  the  relationship  between  ﬁrm’s  sourcing  decisions
nd  productivity.
This  section  is  organized  as  follows.  First,  we  deﬁne  the
roductivity  measures  that  we  use.  Second,  we  introduce
he  empirical  approach  to  determine  whether  there  are  sys-
ematic  productivity  differences  between  ﬁrms  according
o  their  outsourcing  strategy.  Third,  we  present  the  main
esults  of  this  analysis.  Finally,  we  present  some  robustness
hecks.
easures  of  ﬁrm  productivity
ith  respect  to  the  measurement  of  productivity,  we  con-
ider  three  alternative  deﬁnitions.  The  objective  of  looking
t  alternative  measures  of  productivity  is  to  be  able  to
heck  the  robustness  of  our  results  to  different  methods  and
ssumptions.Our  ﬁrst  measure  is  labour  productivity,  which  is  deﬁned
s  the  ratio  of  value  of  gross  production  of  goods  and  services
xpressed  in  real  terms  to  the  number  of  yearly  effective
ours  of  work.
i
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The  second  measure  refers  to  TFP  and  follows  the  frame-
ork  developed  by  Aw  et  al.  (2001).  In  particular,  it  is  an
xtension  of  the  multilateral  total  factor  productivity  index
roposed  by  Caves  et  al.  (1982),  and  has  been  used  pre-
iously  by  Delgado  et  al.  (2002).  The  expression  used  to
stimate  total  factor  productivity  for  ﬁrm  i,  at  time  t,  in
 given  industry  is:
it =  yit −  y − 12
R∑
r=1
(ωrit +  ωr)(xrit −  xr ) +  y −  y
− 1
2
R∑
r=1
(ωr +  ωr)(xr −  xr)
here  yit is  the  log  of  output,  xrit is  the  log  of  input  r,  and
r
it is  the  cost  share  of  input  r.  Firms  are  classiﬁed  in  two
ize  groups  of  small  and  large  ﬁrms· A  bar  over  a  variable
ndicates  the  arithmetic  mean  of  the  variable.  The  average
alue  of  variables  with  index  ,  refers  to  a  given  size  group
f  ﬁrms;  otherwise,  the  average  refers  to  the  entire  sample
f  small  and  large  ﬁrms.  The  estimation  of  this  index  con-
iders  three  inputs:  labour,  intermediate  inputs  and  capital
nput.  Input  cost  shares,  ωrit,  are  deﬁned  as  the  fraction  of
he  cost  of  each  input  in  total  input  costs.  Total  input  costs
re  deﬁned  by  the  sum  of  labour  costs,  intermediate  input
osts  and  the  cost  of  capital.  The  cost  of  labour  is  measured
y  the  sum  of  wages,  social  security  contributions,  and  other
abour  costs  paid  by  the  ﬁrm.  The  cost  of  intermediate  inputs
s  measured  by  the  sum  of  costs  of  raw  materials  purchases,
nergy  and  fuel  costs  and  other  services  paid  for  by  the  ﬁrm.
ntermediate  inputs  are  expressed  in  real  terms  using  indi-
idual  price  indexes  of  intermediate  inputs  reported  by  the
rms.  The  user  cost  of  capital  is  measured  for  each  ﬁrm
y  the  cost  of  the  long-term  external  debt  of  each  ﬁrm  as
eported  by  the  ESEE  plus  the  depreciation  rate,  dit,  minus
he  variation  of  the  aggregate  price  index  for  capital  goods.
etails  of  the  deﬁnition  of  output  and  inputs  can  be  found
n  the  appendix.
The  index  takes  a  hypothetical  ﬁrm  as  a  reference  and
easures  productivity  in  each  year  relative  to  this  refer-
nce  ﬁrm.  In  particular,  the  index  uses  the  average  ﬁrm  of
he  industry  and  the  size  group  the  ﬁrm  belongs  to  as  the
eference  point,  and  then  chain-links  the  average  ﬁrm  for
oth  size  groups  to  preserve  transitiveness  between  ﬁrms
f  different  size  groups  within  the  same  industry.  Reference
rms  are  deﬁned  in  terms  of  industry  and  size  in  order  to
ake  advantage  of  the  characteristics  of  the  data  set.  One
f  the  advantages  of  this  measure  of  productivity  is  that
t  is  consistent  with  the  assumption  of  ﬁrm  heterogeneity,
hich  plays  a  crucial  role  in  the  choice  of  organizational
orm  according  to  the  literature  we  take  as  a  reference  to
rganize  our  empirical  work.  This  heterogeneity  is  reﬂected
n  the  fact  that  input  costs  used  in  the  estimation  of  TFP  are
ifferent  across  ﬁrms  within  the  same  industry.
Our  third  measure  is  based  on  the  estimation  of  produc-
ion  functions.  As  it  is  well  known,  this  procedure  results
n  an  endogeneity  bias  due  to  the  fact  that  productivity
s  known  to  the  ﬁrms  when  they  choose  their  input.  As  a
onsequence,  the  estimation  and  the  resulting  TFP  residual
re  biased.  A  solution  to  this  issue  has  been  the  use  of
stimators  that  model  the  unobserved  productivity  by
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using  the  semiparametric  estimator  introduced  by  Olley
and  Pakes  (1996).  They  address  the  simultaneity  issue  by
developing  a  two-step  estimator  of  the  production  function
where  the  level  of  investment  spending  by  the  ﬁrm  is  used
to  proxy  for  its  unobserved  productivity.  We  implement  the
Olley  and  Pakes  (OP)  routine  with  our  dataset  for  industries
deﬁned  at  the  two-digit  level.  The  level  of  ﬁrms’  equipment
investment  as  well  as  capital,  labour  and  intermediate
inputs  as  they  have  been  deﬁned  for  the  calculation  of  it
were  used  to  estimate  TFP.
The  estimation  algorithm  of  OP  additionally  provides  a
solution  to  the  selection  problem  associated  with  the  use  of
a  panel  of  ﬁrms  to  estimate  TFP.  Therefore,  we  take  into
account  the  survival  probability  of  the  ﬁrm.  As  exit  deci-
sions  by  ﬁrms  are  reported  in  the  dataset,  we  can  distinguish
between  ﬁrms  exiting  from  the  market  and  ﬁrms  exiting  the
panel  due  to  attrition.
The  dataset  used  is  particularly  attractive  for  the  estima-
tion  of  TFP  and  for  the  estimation  of  production  functions.
Firms  directly  report  their  output  price  index  as  well  as  the
price  variation  of  their  intermediate  inputs.  This  dataset  has
been  used  extensively  in  the  literature  to  address  the  various
econometric  issues  related  to  the  estimation  of  produc-
tion  functions  (see,  for  example,  Mairesse  and  Jaumandreu,
2005;  Ornaghi  and  Van  Beveren,  2011).
Empirical  methodology
The  aim  of  this  analysis  is  to  determine  whether  there  are
systematic  productivity  differences  between  ﬁrms  accord-
ing  to  their  outsourcing  strategy.  The  estimation  of  these
differences  across  groups  of  ﬁrms  is  made  controlling  for
other  ﬁrm  characteristics.  We  follow  the  methodology  pro-
posed  by  Bernard  and  Jensen  (1999)  for  the  estimation
of  the  so-called  exporter  productivity  premia,  deﬁned  as
the  ceteris  paribus  percentage  difference  of  productivity
between  exporters  and  non-exporters.  A  similar  approach
was  previously  applied  by  Tomiura  (2007)  to  estimate  pro-
ductivity  premia  for  FO  and  FDI  ﬁrms  as  well  as  Federico
(2010)  and  Kohler  and  Smolka  (2011)  for  the  estimation  of
more  general  sourcing  premia.
In  particular,  sourcing  premia  is  estimated  from  a  regres-
sion  of  log  productivity  on  the  current  sourcing  status  of
the  ﬁrm  (deﬁned  by  a  set  of  dummy  variables)  and  a  set  of
control  variables.  In  particular,  we  estimate  the  following
equation:
ln  (productivity)it =  ˇ0 +  ˇ1 FIit +  ˇ2 FOit +  ˇ3 DOit
+  ˇ4 Controlit +  j +  t +  it (1)
where  i  is  the  index  of  the  ﬁrm  and  t is  the  index  of  the  year.
The  variable  productivity  corresponds  to  one  of  the  three
alternative  deﬁnitions  of  productivity  as  explained  above.
FI,  FO  and  DO  are  dummy  variables  that  capture  the  current
sourcing  status  of  the  ﬁrm  (one  if  the  ﬁrm  is  included  in  any
of  the  groups  of  ﬁrms  that  are  considered,  and  0  otherwise).
We  shall  return  to  the  criteria  used  for  classifying  ﬁrms  in
different  sourcing  groups  below.  Control  is  a  vector  of  con-
trol  variables  that  include  size,  age  and  the  export  status  of
the  ﬁrm.  The  size  of  the  ﬁrm  is  introduced  as  the  log  of  the
number  of  employees  and  its  squared  value.  We  follow  the
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mpirical  literature  on  productivity  premia  for  exporting  in
onsidering  the  set  of  control  variables  (see  ISGEP,  2008).
Since  the  sample  includes  ﬁrms  operating  in  several
ndustries,  a  set  of  industry  dummies  is  included  to  take
nto  account  industry  ﬁxed  effects,   j. Similarly,  as  ﬁrms
re  affected  by  common  shocks  over  time,  t,  a  set  of
ime  dummies  is  included  to  control  year-speciﬁc  produc-
ivity  shocks.  Finally,  it =  i +  εit is  a  composite  error  term
ncluding  an  unobserved  ﬁrm-speciﬁc  effect  (i)  and  an
diosyncratic  error  term  (εit).
In  Eq.  (1),  DI  is  the  baseline  sourcing  category  against
hich  the  productivity  premiums  of  the  rest  of  the  cat-
gories  (FI,  FO  and  DO)  are  measured.  The  sourcing
roductivity  premiums  computed  from  the  coefﬁcients  ˇ1,
2 and  ˇ3 are  estimated  as  100((exp(ˇ))  −  1),  and  they  show
he  average  percentage  difference  in  productivity  between
wo  group  of  ﬁrms  after  controlling  for  industry,  year,  size,
ge  and  export  status  of  the  ﬁrm.
Now,  we  turn  to  explain  the  criteria  used  for  classifying
rms  in  the  different  sourcing  groups  studied.  In  much  of
he  theoretical  literature  on  global  sourcing,  ﬁrms  make  a
iscrete  choice  according  to  which  there  is  a  unique  proﬁt
aximizing  strategy.  Firms  choose  either  FI,  or  FO,  or  DI,
r  DO.  However,  as  reported  in  the  previous  section,  a  high
ercentage  of  ﬁrms  follows  a  mixed  sourcing  strategy,  and
hey  subcontract  intermediate  inputs  from  various  sources
t  the  same  time.  This  behaviour  can  easily  be  explained  by
ssuming  that  ﬁrms  need  several  intermediate  inputs,  they
hoose  the  optimal  organization  for  each  input  and,  as  a
onsequence,  we  might  observe  ﬁrms  using  mixed  strategies
n  their  sourcing  behaviour.
Given  the  existence  of  mixed  strategies,  we  need  some
lassiﬁcation  criteria  for  assigning  ﬁrms  to  the  four  sourc-
ng  groups.  We  deﬁne  sourcing  dummies  in  three  alternative
ays.  First,  we  start  by  assigning  ﬁrms  to  a  given  organi-
ational  group  according  to  the  ranking  of  productivities
uggested  by  Antràs  and  Helpman  (2004).  In  this  case,  we
pply  a  strict  sourcing  ranking  that  states  that  when  a  ﬁrm
s  active  in  more  than  one  sourcing  mode,  we  classify  it
n  one  exclusive  category  according  to  the  following  rank-
ng,  FI  >  FO  >  DI  > DO.  Therefore,  ﬁrms  that  buy  at  least  some
ntermediate  inputs  through  foreign  integration  are  assigned
o  the  group  FI.  The  group  of  ﬁrms  that  perform  some
oreign  outsourcing  but  not  foreign  integration  is  assigned
he  dummy  FO.  Firms  that  subcontract  intermediate  inputs
n  the  domestic  market  but  do  not  outsource  or  integrate
broad  are  considered  DO  ﬁrms.  Finally,  as  the  group  of  ﬁrms
hat  integrate  in  the  domestic  market  forms  a  residual  group
f  ﬁrms  which  does  not  simultaneously  perform  any  other
ourcing  strategy,  we  assign  them  to  the  group  DI.
Second,  an  alternative  classiﬁcation  method  is  to  assign
rms  according  to  the  intensity  of  their  sourcing  activity.
ith  this  criterion,  we  assign  each  ﬁrm  to  the  group  with
he  highest  proportion  of  subcontracted  inputs  relative  to
he  value  of  intermediate  inputs.
Third,  an  alternative  way  to  construct  sourcing  dummies
s  what  can  be  called  non-mutually  exclusive  classiﬁcation
Federico  (2010)  and  Kohler  and  Smolka  (2011)  both  apply similar  procedure).  With  non-mutually  exclusive  coding,
ach  ﬁrm  is  classiﬁed  in  more  than  one  dummy  variable  if
ursuing  multiple  sourcing  strategies.  Firms  can  belong  to
ore  than  one  group.  For  example,  for  a  ﬁrm  that  engages
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Table  3  Classiﬁcation  of  ﬁrms  according  to  their  sourcing  strategy:  alternative  methods  (percentages  relative  to  the  total
number of  ﬁrms).
Classiﬁcations  Firms  with  ≤200  employees  Firms  with  >200  employees  All  ﬁrms
1.  Ranking  FI  >  FO  >  DI  >  DO
Domestic  outsourcing  (DO)  16.6  2.2  12.4
Foreign outsourcing  (FO)  17.9  34.6  22.8
Foreign integration  (FI)  2.5  14.1  5.9
2. Intensity  of  sourcing
Domestic  outsourcing  (DO) 34.8  42.9  37.1
Foreign outsourcing  (FO) 1.5  5.0  2.6
Foreign integration  (FI) 0.7  3.0  1.4
3. Not  mutually  exclusive  coding
Domestic  outsourcing  (DO)  37.0  49.2  41.1
Foreign outsourcing  (FO)  19.9  47.0  27.9
Foreign integration  (FI) 2.5  14.1  5.9
Domestic integration  (DI) 63.0  49.1  58.9
Number of  observations 14,197  5,939  20,136
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ln  both  domestic  outsourcing  and  foreign  outsourcing,  the
ummies  FO  and  DO  both  take  on  a  value  of  one.
The  use  of  the  ﬁrst  two  classiﬁcations,  one  based  on
he  sourcing  decision  itself  and  the  other  on  the  inten-
ity  of  sourcing,  have  the  advantage  of  being  in  line  with
heoretical  models  in  which  ﬁrms  adopt  a  unique  sourcing
trategy.  An  additional  advantage  of  both  classiﬁcations  is
hat  it  allows  for  a  more  clear-cut  identiﬁcation  of  each
rganizational  form.  This  is  especially  true  in  the  case  of
I  and  FO  ﬁrms  for  which  the  incidence  of  mixed  strate-
ies  is  rather  large.  Table  3  reports  how  ﬁrms  in  our  data
et  are  classiﬁed  according  to  the  application  of  the  three
revious  criteria.  According  to  the  ﬁrst  classiﬁcation  based
n  a  ‘‘sourcing  ranking,’’  DO  is  less  prevalent  than  FO:
4.4%  of  the  ﬁrms  perform  DO  against  22.8%  that  perform
O.  However,  according  to  the  classiﬁcation  based  on  a
‘not-mutually  exclusive  coding’’,  DO  is  the  most  preva-
ent  sourcing  mode  with  41.1%  of  the  ﬁrms  adopting  this
rganizational  form.  An  important  advantage  of  the  use  of
 classiﬁcation  based  on  a  not-mutually  exclusive  coding
s  that  it  fully  exploits  the  information  contained  in  the
ataset.  One  of  the  objectives  of  using  three  alternative
lassiﬁcations  is  to  check  if  our  results  are  robust  to  alter-
ative  classiﬁcation  methods.
ain  results
able  4  presents  the  main  results  on  sourcing  premia  for  the
hree  classiﬁcations  of  the  sourcing  groups,  and  for  each  of
he  productivity  measures.  The  ﬁrst  set  of  results  in  Table  4
columns  1--3)  is  based  on  the  ranking  FI  >  FO  >  DI  >  DO.  A
rst  result  to  note  is  that,  independently  of  the  produc-
ivity  measure  used,  the  coefﬁcients  for  FI  are  the  largest.
oreover,  these  differences  are  statistically  signiﬁcant.  This
esult,  which  is  consistent  with  the  models  of  global  sourc-
ng,  means  that  ﬁrms  that  rely  on  international  vertical
ntegration  (FI)  perform  better  than  ﬁrms  that  outsource
y  a  different  strategy.  The  magnitude  of  the  productivity
t
c
o
rremia  for  FI  is  much  larger  for  labour  productivity  (23.48%)
han  for  TFP  measures  (3.40%  and  1.95%,  respectively).
With  respect  to  FO,  DO  and  DI  ﬁrms,  estimates  identify  a
anking  of  coefﬁcients  quite  consistent  to  the  theory  when
sing  labour  productivity  and  a  TFP  index.  For  both  meas-
res,  the  coefﬁcients  for  DO  are  the  lowest  (although  this
oefﬁcient  is  not  signiﬁcant  when  using  labour  productiv-
ty),  and  ﬁrms  that  outsource  in  the  foreign  market  (FO)
nd  integrate  in  the  domestic  market  (DI)  are  at  interme-
iate  positions  in  the  ranking  of  productivities.  Moreover,
he  average  productivity  is  higher  for  FO  ﬁrms  relative  to  DI
rms  (although  FO  coefﬁcient  is  not  signiﬁcant  when  using
n  index  of  TFP).  Again,  differences  between  coefﬁcients
eported  in  the  table  are  statistically  signiﬁcant.  Overall,
hese  differences  are  consistent  with  the  ranking  of  pro-
uctivities  suggested  by  models  summarized  in  ‘Theoretical
ramework  and  related  literature’  section.
Using  the  TFP  estimated  by  the  OP  procedure,  estimates
or  FO,  DO  and  DI  are  no  longer  consistent  to  the  theory
rediction.  However,  in  this  case,  differences  on  sourcing
remia  seem  to  be  estimated  more  imprecisely.  In  particular,
ifferences  between  DO  and  FO  ﬁrms  are  not  statistically
igniﬁcant.
Now,  we  focus  on  the  results  for  sourcing  premia  when
rms  are  assigned  to  a sourcing  group  depending  exclu-
ively  on  their  level  of  sourcing  intensity  (see  columns  4--6  in
able  4).  Again,  results  show  a  ranking  of  coefﬁcients  quite
onsistent  to  the  theory.  First,  ﬁrms  using  FI  as  the  main
hannel  for  their  sourcing  behaviour  continue  at  the  top  of
he  ranking  of  productivities.  Second,  FO  ﬁrms  are,  for  all
hree  types  of  productivity  measures,  in  the  second  position
f  the  ranking  of  productivities.  Finally,  for  two  of  the  three
roductivity  measures,  the  average  productivity  is  higher  for
I  ﬁrms  relative  to  DO  ﬁrms.  This  is  not  the  result  when  using
abour  productivity.  A  possible  explanation  for  this  result  is
hat,  using  this  classiﬁcation  criteria  some  ﬁrms  previously
lassiﬁed  as  FI  or  FO  ﬁrms  are  now  assigned  to  the  group
f  DO  ﬁrms.  This  reassignment  of  ﬁrms  between  groups  may
aise  the  average  level  of  productivity  of  DO  ﬁrms  and,  as  a
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Table  4  Estimation  of  sourcing  premia:  main  results.
Dummy  variables  based  on  the  ranking
FI  >  FO  >  DI  >  DO
Dummy  variables  based  on  the  level  of
sourcing  intensity
Dummy  variables  based  on  a  not-mutually
exclusive  classiﬁcation
Labour
productivity
TFP  (Index) TFP  (OP) Labour
productivity
TFP  (index) TFP  (OP) Labour
productivity
TFP  (index) TFP  (OP)
Sourcing  dummies:
DO  −1.74 −1.79*** −1.27** 6.79*** −0.61* −1.76*** 0.34  −1.44*** −0.97***
(1.43)  (0.55)  (0.63)  (1.04)  (0.36)  (0.42)  (1.42)  (0.54)  (0.61)
FO 14.07*** 0.07  −2.02*** 35.84*** 4.19*** 2.69** 12.47*** 1.36** −1.20*
(1.34)  (0.43)  (0.49)  (3.82)  (1.15)  (1.33)  (1.81)  (0.61)  (0.67)
FI 23.48*** 3.40*** 1.95** 54.62*** 5.90*** 7.64*** 10.91*** 3.65*** 3.98***
(2.27)  (0.69)  (0.82)  (5.93)  (1.37)  (1.76)  (2.05)  (0.70)  (0.84)
Other variables:
Size  0.033  0.032*** 0.007  0.042* 0.033*** 0.006  0.036  0.032*** 0.007
(0.023) (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.023)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.023)  (0.008)  (0.009)
(Size)2 0.009*** −0.002*** −0.000  0.008*** −0.002*** 0.000  0.009*** −0.002*** −0.000
(0.002) (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)
Age 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.007** 0.032*** 0.028*** 0.006** 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.007**
(0.006)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.006)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.002)  (0.003)
Export 0.358*** 0.040*** 0.002  0.372*** 0.042*** 0.001  0.362*** 0.040*** 0.002
(0.012) (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.012)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.012)  (0.004)  (0.005)
Equality tests  (p-values):
DO  vs.  FO  0.000  0.003  0.282  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.008  0.846
DO vs.  FI  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
FO vs.  FI  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.005  0.321  0.019  0.587  0.012  0.000
Observations 20,135  20,030  20,135  20,135  20,030  20,135  20,135  20,030  20,135
R2 0.361  0.138  0.526  0.362  0.138  0.526  0.360  0.138  0.526
Note: Estimated coefﬁcients from OLS-regressions of productivity on dummy variables that capture the current sourcing status of the ﬁrm (DO, domestic outsourcing; FO, foreign outsourcing;
FI, foreign integration), a full set of year dummies, a full set of industry dummies and a set of control variables. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity
of estimated coefﬁcients. In order to facilitate the interpretation, the estimated coefﬁcients for the sourcing status dummies have been transformed by 100(exp(ˇj) − 1) where ˇj are the
estimated coefﬁcients. The three rows grouped under the name Equality tests give p-values of tests for equality of coefﬁcients.
* Signiﬁcance at 10% conﬁdence level.
** Signiﬁcance at 5% conﬁdence level.
*** Signiﬁcance at 1% conﬁdence level.
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Table  5  Summary  of  results.
Measure  of  productivity  Type  of  classiﬁcation
Based  on  the  ranking
FI >  FO  >  DI  >  DO
Based  on  the  level  of
sourcing  intensity
Not-mutually
exclusive
Labour  productivity  FI  >  FO  >  DI  =  DO  FI  >  FO  >  DO  >  DI  FI  =  FO  >  DI  =  DO
TFP (index)  FI  >  FO  =  DI  >  DO  FI  =  FO  >  DI  >  DO  FI  >  FO  >  DI  >  DO
TFP (OP)  FI  >  DI  >  FO  =  DO  FI  >  FO  >  DI  >  DO  FI  >  DI  >  FO  =  DO
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tonsequence  of  this  feature,  DI  ﬁrms  appear  at  the  bottom
f  the  ranking  when  using  labour  productivity.
The  last  set  of  results  in  Table  4  (columns  7--9)  explic-
tly  addresses  the  incidence  of  mixed  sourcing  strategies.
his  feature  of  the  data  is  captured  by  coding  sourcing
ummies  in  a  non-mutually  exclusive  way.  In  this  case,  evi-
ence  on  the  relationship  between  sourcing  strategies  and
roductivity  is  not  as  conclusive  as  before.  First,  for  two
f  the  three  productivity  measures,  the  coefﬁcients  for  FI
re  the  largest,  and  the  differences  with  respect  to  the  sec-
nd  category  (FO)  are  statistically  signiﬁcant.  However,  this
esult  no  longer  holds  when  labour  productivity  is  used.  In
his  case,  estimated  coefﬁcient  of  FO  is  larger  than  the  FI
ne,  although  they  are  not  statistically  different.  Second,
O  ﬁrms  are  in  the  second  position  of  the  ranking  of  pro-
uctivities  only  when  the  index  of  TFP  is  used.  Finally,  DO
rms  only  clearly  appear  at  the  bottom  of  the  ranking  when
sing  the  TFP  estimated  by  the  OP  procedure.  However,  it  is
mportant  to  notice  that  a  high  percentage  of  ﬁrms  follows  a
ixed  sourcing  strategy.  Therefore,  when  using  this  classiﬁ-
ation  method,  a  large  fraction  of  ﬁrms  is  classiﬁed  in  more
han  one  dummy  variable,  and  this  makes  identiﬁcation  of
roductivity  premia  associated  to  global  sourcing  difﬁcult.
or  this  reason  we  prefer  not  giving  the  same  weight  to  the
esults  obtained  with  this  classiﬁcation  as  to  the  others.
We  summarize  our  results  in  Table  5,  which  combines
he  three  classiﬁcations  and  the  three  alternative  deﬁnitions
f  productivity.  Overall,  in  two  out  of  the  nine  possibilities
he  sorting  of  ﬁrm  productivities  is  fully  consistent  with  the
anking  proposed  by  Antràs  and  Helpman  (2004).  However,
e  also  conﬁrm  many  partial  aspects  of  the  ranking:
 FI  ﬁrms  are  always  at  the  top  of  the  distributions  of
ﬁrm  productivity.  In  two  out  of  the  nine  comparisons  FI
ﬁrms  share  the  highest  level  of  productivity  with  FO  ﬁrms
although  differences  are  not  statistically  signiﬁcant.
 The  lowest  level  of  productivity  corresponds,  almost
always,  to  DO  ﬁrms.  Only  for  labour  productivity  and  the
classiﬁcation  based  on  source  intensity,  DO  ﬁrms  have
higher  productivity  than  DI  ﬁrms.  In  four  other  compar-
isons  DO  is  at  the  bottom  of  the  distribution  but  the
difference  is  not  statistically  signiﬁcant  with  respect  to
some  other  group.
 In  seven  out  of  the  nine  comparisons  FI  and  FO  ﬁrms
dominate  the  productivity  of  ﬁrms  following  a  domestic
sourcing  strategy.
 With  a  few  exceptions,  the  general  pattern  of  productiv-
ity  differentials  indicates  that  FI  ﬁrms  perform  among  the
best  and  DO  ﬁrms  perform  among  the  worst.
i
i
c
Tobustness  checks
e  assess  three  robustness  checks  of  our  ﬁndings.  The  two
rst  robustness  checks  are  related  to  the  deﬁnition  of  the
ample,  while  the  third  one  is  related  to  the  estimation
ethod.  The  ﬁrst  robustness  check  concerns  the  classiﬁca-
ion  of  ‘‘non-sourcing’’  ﬁrms  as  ﬁrms  that  fully  integrate
n  the  domestic  market  (DI).  The  second  robustness  check
efers  to  the  distinction  between  headquarter  ﬁrms  and
fﬁliate  ﬁrms.  As  Kohler  and  Smolka  (2011)  suggest,  pre-
ictions  of  models  of  global  sourcing  should  refer  to  true
eadquarter  ﬁrms.  Given  the  importance  of  inward  FDI  in
he  Spanish  manufacturing  sector,  we  control  for  this  fact
estricting  the  sample  of  ﬁrms  used  to  true  headquarter
rms.  The  third  robustness  check  presents  ﬁxed  effects
stimation  results.  In  doing  these  robustness  checks,  we
estrict  the  analysis  to  the  classiﬁcation  of  ﬁrms  based
n  the  ranking  FI  >  FO  >  DI  >  DO.  Therefore,  the  comparison
hould  be  made  with  the  results  shown  in  columns  1--3  in
able  4.
The  ﬁrst  robustness  check  is  presented  in  columns  1--3  in
able  6.  In  this  case,  we  test  the  robustness  of  our  ﬁndings
o  the  consideration  of  ‘‘non-sourcing’’  ﬁrms  as  DI  ﬁrms.
n  previous  tables,  when  the  incidence  of  subcontracting  is
ero,  we  interpret  this  as  a  form  of  domestic  integration  in
hich  all  intermediate  inputs  occur  within  the  same  ﬁrm.  An
lternative  decision  would  have  been  to  drop  these  ‘‘non-
ourcing’’  ﬁrms  from  the  estimation  sample  considering  that
e  are  only  able  to  fully  observe  three  groups  of  sourcing
rms:  FI,  FO  and  DO.
The  ﬁrst  set  of  results  in  Table  6  (columns  1--3)  reports
he  results  of  the  estimates  when  the  group  of  DI  ﬁrms  is
ropped  from  the  sample.  In  this  case,  DO  is  the  baseline
ourcing  category  against  which  the  productivity  premiums
f  the  rest  of  the  categories  (FI  and  FO)  are  measured.  We
nd  that  the  magnitude  of  the  coefﬁcient  is  highest  for  FI,
owest  for  DO,  and  it  is  at  an  intermediate  level  for  FO  ﬁrms.
hese  results  are  similar  to  those  presented  in  Table  4.  The
ain  difference  is  found  when  TFP  is  estimated  using  the
lley--Pakes  procedure.  In  this  case,  the  difference  between
O  and  DO  is  as  expected  according  to  Antràs  and  Helpman
2004), but  it  is  not  statistically  signiﬁcant.  Therefore,  we
an  conclude  that  the  main  results  are  robust  to  excluding
he  group  of  ‘‘non-sourcing’’  ﬁrms.
The  second  robustness  check  is  presented  in  columns  4--6
n  Table  6, which  reports  regression  results  obtained  exclud-
ng  non-true  headquarter  ﬁrms.  Models  of  global  sourcing
onsider  the  sourcing  decisions  of  true-headquarter  ﬁrms.
he  sample  of  Spanish  manufacturing  ﬁrms  we  are  using
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Table  6  Estimation  of  sourcing  premia:  robustness  checks  (dummy  variables  based  on  the  ranking  FI  >  FO  >  DI  >  DO).
Excluding  ﬁrms  that  integrate  at  home  (DI) Excluding  local  afﬁliates  which  are  majority
owned  by  a  foreign  ﬁrm
Fixed  effects  results
Labour
productivity
TFP  (index) TFP  (OP) Labour
productivity
TFP  (index) TFP  (OP) Labour
productivity
TFP  (index) TFP  (OP)
Sourcing  dummies:
DO  -- -- -- 1.24  −1.41** −1.54** 0.22  −0.32 −0.35
(1.46) (0.57)  (0.65)  (1.09)  (0.58)  (0.69)
FO 38.76*** 3.81*** 0.96  23.29*** 1.01** −2.20*** 2.62*** −0.05 −0.55
(2.67) (0.74)  (0.80)  (1.59)  (0.49)  (0.55)  (1.03)  (0.54)  (0.55)
FI 64.37*** 7.98*** 5.63*** 27.36*** 5.18*** 2.62* 1.73  0.37  −0.34
(4.20) (1.04)  (1.19)  (3.46)  (1.26)  (1.35)  (1.70)  (1.05)  (1.07)
Other variables:
Size  −0.186*** 0.009  −0.035*** 0.058** 0.013  0.002  −0.371*** −0.087*** −0.049
(0.034) (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.027)  (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.070)  (0.030)  (0.034)
(Size)2 0.026*** −0.001  0.003** 0.003  −0.001  0.000  0.018** 0.009** 0.008**
(0.004)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.008)  (0.004)  (0.004)
Age −0.011 0.015*** −0.002 0.053*** 0.030*** 0.008*** 0.007  0.024* −0.002
(0.009) (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.007)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.024)  (0.014)  (0.016)
Export 0.231*** 0.033*** 0.020  0.332*** 0.033*** −0.001  0.055*** 0.014  0.013
(0.018) (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.012)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.015)  (0.009)  (0.009)
Equality tests  (p-values):
DO  vs.  FO  --  --  --  0.000  0.000  0.370  0.065  0.712  0.801
DO vs.  FI  --  --  --  0.000  0.000  0.004  0.438  0.554  0.992
FO vs.  FI  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.235  0.001  0.000  0.595  0.681  0.842
Observations 8,273  8,241  8,273  16,979  16,885  16,979  20,135  20,030  20,135
R2 0.580  0.137  0.580  0.327  0.125  0.523  0.221  0.141  0.069
Note: Estimated coefﬁcients from OLS-regressions of productivity on dummy variables that capture the current sourcing status of the ﬁrm (DO, domestic outsourcing; FO, foreign outsourcing;
FI, foreign integration), a full set of year dummies, a full set of industry dummies and a set of control variables. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity
of estimated coefﬁcients. In order to facilitate the interpretation, the estimated coefﬁcients for the sourcing status dummies have been transformed by 100(exp(ˇj) − 1) where ˇj are the
estimated coefﬁcients. The three rows grouped under the name Equality tests give p-values of tests for equality of coefﬁcients.
* Signiﬁcance at 10% conﬁdence level.
** Signiﬁcance at 5% conﬁdence level.
*** Signiﬁcance at 1% conﬁdence level.
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o  test  the  ranking  of  productivities  includes  foreign-owned
rms.  They  are  subsidiaries  of  multinational  ﬁrms  that  have
n  SIC  manufacturing  code  as  their  principal  business  activ-
ty.  In  these  companies,  the  parent  ﬁrm  might  decide  about
he  sourcing  strategy  of  the  subsidiary.  The  presence  of
uch  ﬁrms  in  the  sample  can  be  the  source  of  a  poten-
ial  bias.  This  is  especially  true  in  the  case  of  subsidiaries
erforming  FI  as  they  could  be  sourcing  from  their  parent
ompanies.
In  the  second  set  of  results  in  Table  6  (columns  4--6),
he  sample  of  ﬁrms  is  restricted  to  true  headquarter  ﬁrms.
his  means  the  exclusion  of  local  subsidiaries  that  are
ajority-owned  by  foreign  capital  (more  than  50%  of  the
otal  stockholders’  equity  of  the  ﬁrm  is  subject  to  foreign
wnership).  The  application  of  this  criterion  excludes  15.7%
f  the  total  number  of  observations  in  the  original  sample.
esults  are  similar  to  those  presented  in  columns  1--3  in
able  4,  and  the  ranking  of  productivities  is  exactly  the  same
ith  both  samples  (including  and  excluding  non-true  head-
uarter  ﬁrms).  Again,  we  can  conclude  that  our  main  results
re  robust  to  this  check.
The  third  robustness  check  presents  ﬁxed  effects  results.
n  principle,  this  is  one  possible  way  to  account  for  unob-
erved  heterogeneity  associated  with  time-invariant  ﬁrm
haracteristics  which  may  lead  to  a  biased  estimate  of  the
ourcing  productivity  premia.  However,  in  a  context  with
ore  than  two  categories  (such  as  ours  is),  the  interpreta-
ion  of  ﬁxed  effects  results  is  not  clear,  and  as  a  consequence
stimated  coefﬁcients  may  not  be  interpreted  as  indicating
he  presence  of  a  sourcing  premia  (see  Kohler  and  Smolka
2011)  for  a  discussion  about  this  problem).  Furthermore,
lthough  dummy  variables  representing  the  sourcing  strate-
ies  of  the  ﬁrms  (FI,  FO,  DI,  and  DO)  are  time-varying
ariables,  the  low  within  variation  of  these  variables  casts
oubts  on  the  identiﬁcation  of  their  effects  using  a  ﬁxed
ffects  approach.
Fixed  effects  results  are  shown  in  columns  7--9  in  Table  6.
n  this  case,  we  do  not  observe  statistically  signiﬁcant  pro-
uctivity  differences  between  ﬁrms  with  different  sourcing
trategies.  Therefore,  productivity  premia  associated  with
ourcing  are  not  robust  to  the  inclusion  of  ﬁxed  effects.  How-
ver,  as  we  explained  before,  this  result  should  be  viewed
ith  some  caveats.
ffshoring and ﬁrm productivity: selection vs.
elocation
he  results  of  the  previous  section  reveal  a  quite  robust  pat-
ern  of  correlation  between  ﬁrm  productivity  and  sourcing
ecisions.  As  we  said  at  the  beginning  of  ‘Sourcing  strategies
nd  the  pattern  of  ﬁrm  productivities’  section,  this  pattern
oes  not  establish  any  kind  of  causality  running  from  a  ﬁrm’s
ourcing  behaviour  to  its  productivity  level  nor  in  the  other
irection.  However,  the  panel  structure  of  our  dataset  per-
its  us  to  perform  two  basic  descriptive  regressions  that
an  be  interpreted  in  terms  of  an  alternative  hypothesis
oncerning  the  relationship  between  offshoring  and  ﬁrm  pro-
uctivity.  In  what  follows,  we  present  two  analyses  that  offer
dditional  empirical  evidence  on  the  relationship  between
roductivity  and  input  sourcing.
ﬁ
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election  hypothesis
he  ﬁrst  analysis  refers  to  what  can  be  called  the  selection
ypothesis.  An  interpretation  of  models  of  global  sourcing
s  consistent  with  the  idea  that  ﬁrms  self-select  in  an  orga-
izational  mode  according  to  their  level  of  productivity.  If
rganizational  ﬁxed  costs  are  higher  for  foreign  integration
han  for  the  rest  of  the  organizational  modes,  then  proﬁt
aximization  would  imply  that  only  the  most  productive
rms  will  be  able  to  bear  the  ﬁxed  costs  of  this  sourcing
trategy.  The  implication  would  be  that  the  most  productive
rms  self-select  into  foreign  integration.
The  group  of  offshoring  ﬁrms  that  either  source  in  a
oreign  country  from  afﬁliated  suppliers  (FI)  or  form  unre-
ated  parties  (FO)  is,  according  to  the  evidence  presented
n  ‘Sourcing  strategies  and  the  pattern  of  ﬁrm  productivi-
ies’  section,  the  group  with  the  highest  average  level  of
roductivity.  Now,  our  objective  is  to  test  whether  this  pro-
uctivity  differential  is  consistent  with  the  selection  of  the
ost  productive  ﬁrms  into  offshoring  (note  that  the  term
ffshoring  refers  to  FI  and  FO).  We  implement  this  test  by
eﬁning  the  cohort  of  ﬁrms  which  start  offshoring.  A  ﬁrm
s  considered  to  be  part  of  the  cohort  of  entering  ﬁrms  in
ear  t if  three  conditions  hold:  (i)  there  is  a  transition  from
on-offshoring  to  offshoring  in  year  t,  (ii)  the  ﬁrm  has  not
erformed  this  activity  for  at  least  3  years  before  (from
 −  3  to  t  −  1),  and  (iii)  the  ﬁrm  continues  to  perform  this
ctivity  at  least  three  years  later  (form  t  +  1  to  t  +  3).  These
onditions  restrict  our  analysis  to  the  period  1993--2002.
elf-selection  would  imply  that  ex  ante, the  productivity
evel  of  ﬁrms  belonging  to  the  cohort  of  offshoring  ﬁrms  at  t
s  higher  than  the  productivity  level  of  non-offshoring  ﬁrms.
ormally,  for  each  cross-section  between  years  1993  and
002:
n  Productivity(t −  1)i =  ˇ0 +  ˇ1 EntryCohort(t)i
+  ˇ2 Controli +  j +  εi (2)
The  sample  of  ﬁrms  for  each  year  is  composed  of
rms  belonging  to  the  cohort  of  offshoring  ﬁrms  and
on-offshoring  ﬁrms.  Productivity(t −  1)  is  the  level  of  pro-
uctivity  of  ﬁrms  at  t  −  1,  Entry  Cohort(t)  is  a  dummy
ariable  equal  to  one  if  the  ﬁrm  belongs  to  the  cohort  of
rms  starting  their  offshoring  activity  at  time  t  and  zero
therwise,  Controli is  a  set  of  control  variables  that  includes
ize,  age  and  exporting,   j is  a  set  of  industry  dummies  and
i is  an  idiosyncratic  error.  The  coefﬁcient  ˇ1 measures  the
x  ante  productivity  differences  between  the  cohort  of  ﬁrms
tarting  offshoring  and  non-offshoring  ﬁrms.
Given  that  the  number  of  ﬁrms  for  each  cohort  of  enter-
ng  ﬁrms  is  rather  small,  Table  7  presents  the  results  from  the
stimation  of  equation  (2)  when  all  observations  are  pooled
n  the  same  regression.  One  advantage  of  pooling  data  across
ears  is  that  it  increases  the  sample  size,  and  it  allows  us
o  obtain  more  accurate  estimations.  On  average,  the  coef-
cient  of  interest  is  positive  and  statistically  signiﬁcant  (at
he  5%  level)  only  for  labour  productivity.  Our  main  conclu-
ion  is  that,  on  average,  evidence  supporting  the  hypothesis
f  self-selection  is  weak.
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Table  7  Ex-ante  productivity  level  differences  between  offshoring  ﬁrms  (FI  and/or  FO) and  non-offshoring  ﬁrms  (pooling
observations over  all  cohorts  of  offshoring  and  non-offshoring  ﬁrms).
Dependent  variable:  Productivity  at  t  −  1  Labour  productivity  TFP  (index)  TFP  (OP)
Dummy  variable:
Cohorts  of  offshoring  ﬁrms  entering  at  t
0.11** 0.01  −0.02
(0.04)  (0.02)  (0.02)
Other variables:
Industry  dummies Included  Included  Included
Cohort dummies Included  Included  Included
Other controls Included  Included  Included
Observations  5,722  5,680  5,722
Note: Each element of this table reproduces the coefﬁcient ˇ1 of Eq. (2) estimated when all observations corresponding to all the entry
cohorts are pooled in the same regression. Estimates present the estimated coefﬁcient ˇ1 from OLS-regressions of productivity at year
t − 1 on a dummy variable equal to one for the cohort of ﬁrms starting their offshoring activity at year t and zero otherwise, a full set
of industry dummies, cohort dummies, and a set of control variables (log(size), (log(size))2 and log(age)), and a dummy for exporting
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estatus. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors robust to hete
** Signiﬁcance at 5% conﬁdence level.
Relocation  hypothesis
The  second  analysis  in  this  section  refers  to  what  can  be
called  the  relocation  hypothesis.  This  evidence  examines  the
relationship  running  from  sourcing  to  productivity  focusing
the  attention  on  offshoring  ﬁrms.  The  literature  on  off-
shoring  has  suggested  many  channels  through  which  foreign
sourcing  might  inﬂuence  productivity.  For  example,  it  could
give  access  to  lower  priced  inputs  or  to  obtain  higher-quality
intermediate  inputs.  It  could  also  be  a  learning  mechanism
by  which  a  ﬁrm  improves  its  products  from  contact  with  new
suppliers  (a  systematic  review  of  all  these  effects  are  sum-
marized  by  Görg  et  al.,  2008).  Instead,  we  concentrate  our
attention  on  one  particular  channel  of  inﬂuence  on  produc-
tivity  that  can  be  easily  identiﬁed.  When  ﬁrms  decide  to
offshore  intermediate  inputs,  they  relocate  parts  of  their
production  stages  to  other  locations.  This  relocation  in  the
choice  of  inputs  implies  a  compositional  change  which  may
have  an  immediate  and  direct  impact  on  ﬁrm  productivity.
We  explore  the  existence  of  this  type  of  effect  on  produc-
tivity  by  looking  at  ﬁrms  with  a  transition  from  the  domestic
market  to  the  foreign  market  in  their  sourcing  of  intermedi-
ate  inputs.  We  compare  the  productivity  growth  in  the  year
a  ﬁrm  starts  to  offshore  with  the  trajectory  of  productivity
before  and  after  this  decision  takes  place.  We  would  expect
an  increase  in  the  productivity  level  of  the  ﬁrm  immediately
after  the  decision  to  source  in  a  foreign  market.  Formally,  we
estimate  the  following  regression  for  the  sample  of  entering
offshoring  ﬁrms  over  the  period  1993--2002:
	  ln  Productivityit =  ˇ0 +  ˇ1 EntryYearit +  ˇ2 Controlit
+  j +  εit (3)
The  sample  of  ﬁrms  included  in  the  estimation  of  Eq.  (3)
is  restricted  to  those  ﬁrms  which  start  offshoring  during  the
period.  As  in  the  estimation  of  Eq.  (2),  a  ﬁrm  is  considered  to
be  part  of  the  sample  of  entering  offshoring  ﬁrms  if:  (i)  there
is  a  transition  from  no-offshoring  to  offshoring,  (ii)  the  ﬁrm
has  not  performed  this  activity  for  at  least  3  years  before,
d
i
m
pdasticity of estimated coefﬁcients.
nd  (iii)  the  ﬁrm  continues  performing  this  activity  at  least
hree  years  later.  Variable  	Productivityit is  the  productiv-
ty  growth  of  ﬁrm  i  at  time  t,  EntryYearit is  a  dummy  variable
qual  to  one  in  the  year  ﬁrm  i starts  its  offshoring  activity
nd  zero  in  the  rest  of  the  years  (i.e.,  EntryYearit =  1  if  ﬁrm
 starts  its  offshoring  activity  at  year  t,  and  0  otherwise),
ontrolit is  a  set  of  control  variables  that  includes  size,  age
nd  exporting,   j is  a  set  of  industry  dummies  and  εit is  an
diosyncratic  error.  The  coefﬁcient  ˇ1 measures  the  produc-
ivity  growth  difference  in  the  year  of  entry  relative  to  the
est  of  the  years.
Table  8  summarizes  the  main  results  of  this  analysis.
he  null  hypothesis  of  relocation  would  imply  a  positive
nd  signiﬁcantly  different  from  zero  coefﬁcient  of  ˇ1 in
q.  (3). However,  we  cannot  reject  the  null  hypothesis  in
ny  of  the  speciﬁcations  that  are  presented  in  Table  8.
herefore,  it  seems  that  there  is  no  change  in  the  rate
f  productivity  growth  for  ﬁrms  that  start  their  offshoring
ctivity  during  the  period.  The  last  set  of  results  in  Table  8
columns  4--6)  reports  additional  evidence  from  regressions
hat  include  two  additional  dummy  variables  (denoted  by
ntryYearit+1 +  1  and  EntryYearit+2 +  2)  identifying  the  sub-
equent  years  to  starting  offshoring  activity  (for  example,
ntryYearit+1 +  1  =  1  if  ﬁrm  i starts  its  offshoring  activity  at
ear  t,  and  0  otherwise).  The  objective  of  the  inclusion
f  these  two  additional  variables  is  to  check  whether  the
ffect  on  productivity  is  observed  with  some  lag.  Again,  as
hese  coefﬁcients  are  not  statistically  signiﬁcantly  different
rom  zero,  we  do  not  ﬁnd  evidence  supporting  the  relocation
ypothesis  in  the  sample  of  offshoring  ﬁrms.
However,  the  literature  has  proposed  alternative  meth-
ds  for  testing  the  relocation  hypothesis.  Using  a  similar
ample  of  ﬁrms  to  that  used  in  this  paper,  Farin˜as et  al.
2014)  ﬁnd  evidence  supporting  this  hypothesis:  ﬁrms’  deci-
ions  to  relocate  some  stages  of  their  production  process  to
xternal  suppliers  result  in  a  positive  impact  on  the  pro-
uctivity  level  of  these  ﬁrms.  However,  there  are  some
mportant  differences  between  both  analyses.  The  ﬁrst  and
ain  difference  is  methodological.  Farin˜as et  al.  (2014)
ropose  testing  the  relocation  hypothesis  in  the  context
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Table  8  Productivity  growth  differences  in  the  transition  to  an  offshoring  (FI  and/or  FO) activity.
Dependent  variable:
Productivity  growth
Labour
productivity
TFP  (index)  TFP  (OP)  Labour
productivity
TFP  (index)  TFP  (OP)
Dummy  variable:
Year  of  entry  1.25  −0.34  −0.47  1.55  −0.23  −0.38
(1.54) (1.04)  (1.07)  (1.56)  (1.05)  (1.08)
Year of  entry  +  1  2.00  0.25  0.08
(1.50)  (1.01)  (1.05)
Year of  entry  +  2 0.79  0.72  0.77
(1.42)  (0.96)  (0.99)
Other variables:
Industry  dummies Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included
Other controls  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included
Observations  2,401  2,385  2,401  2,401  2,385  2,401
Note: Estimates present the coefﬁcient ˇ1 of Eq. (3) estimated from OLS-regressions of productivity growth at year t on a dummy variable
equal to one in the year ﬁrm i starts its offshoring activity and zero in the rest of the years, a full set of industry dummies, a set of
control variables (log(size), (log(size))2 and log(age)), and a dummy for exporting status. The last three columns also include two  dummy
variables: the ﬁrst one is equal to one in the year after ﬁrm i starts its offshoring activity and zero otherwise (Year of entry + 1), and
the second variable is equal to one two years after ﬁrm i starts its offshoring activity and zero otherwise (Year of entry + 2). Numbers in
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sparentheses are standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity of e
f  the  estimation  of  a  production  function.  In  doing  this,
wo  dummy  variables  are  included  to  control  the  deci-
ions  to  start  and/or  stop  outsourcing/offshoring.  A  second
ifference  between  both  studies  is  that,  in  testing  the  relo-
ation  hypothesis,  Farin˜as et  al.  (2014),  due  to  identiﬁcation
estrictions,  do  not  distinguish  between  domestic  outsourc-
ng  (DO  ﬁrms  in  the  terminology  used  in  the  present  paper)
nd  offshoring  (FI  and/or  FO  ﬁrms  in  the  terminology  used
n  the  present  paper).  Therefore,  this  paper  conﬁrms  an
ncrease  in  the  productivity  level  of  the  ﬁrm  immediately
fter  the  decision  to  source  either  in  the  domestic  market
r  abroad.  Overall,  we  conclude  that  the  evidence  on  the
elocation  hypothesis  is  not  conclusive,  so  further  research
s  needed.
onclusions
his  paper  uses  a  sample  of  Spanish  manufacturing  ﬁrms  to
rovide  evidence  on  the  choice  between  outsourcing  and
ntegration  at  home  and  abroad.  It  focuses  on  the  relation-
hip  between  sourcing  strategies  and  ﬁrm  productivity.
Sourcing  decisions  examined  in  this  paper  refer  to  very
peciﬁc  relationships  between  ﬁrms  and  input  suppliers.  One
haracteristic  of  the  dataset  used  is  that  the  information  the
rm  provide  refers  to  intermediate  inputs  acquired  within  a
ilateral  relationship  in  such  a  way  that  goods  are  tailored  to
he  needs  of  the  ﬁrm.  Our  analysis  does  not  simply  refer  to
ow  ﬁrms  acquire  their  intermediate  inputs  but  to  how  ﬁrms
cquire  their  customized  intermediate  inputs.  This  type  of
nformation  adapts  quite  well  to  the  theoretical  literature
n  global  sourcing  that  we  take  as  reference  to  organize  our
mpirical  work.We  perform  our  analysis  along  two  dimensions.  First,  we
nalyse  whether  there  exists  a  relationship  (i.e.  correla-
ion)  between  productivity  and  sourcing  strategies.  Second,
e  present  two  attempts  at  identifying  the  direction  of
a
o
wted coefﬁcients.
ausality.  In  particular,  we  test  for  the  selection  hypothesis
nd  the  relocation  hypothesis.
Regarding  the  correlation  analysis,  our  results  indicate
hat  ﬁrm  productivity  differs  systematically  across  groups
f  ﬁrms  with  different  sourcing  strategies.  In  our  preferred
peciﬁcations,  the  productivity  of  ﬁrms  which  engage  in  for-
ign  integration,  importing  customized  intermediate  inputs
rom  subsidiaries  located  abroad,  outperforms  the  rest  of
he  groups.  In  most  of  the  comparisons,  the  group  of  ﬁrms
hat  outsource  in  the  domestic  market  is  at  the  bottom  of  the
roductivity  distribution.  Moreover,  the  productivity  premia
f  ﬁrms  which  perform  foreign  outsourcing  and  integrate  at
ome  are,  in  general,  in  an  intermediate  position.  In  most
f  the  comparisons,  foreign  outsourcing  ﬁrms  dominate  ﬁrms
hat  integrate  at  home.  As  a  main  conclusion  of  this  analy-
is,  we  ﬁnd  evidence  on  the  relationship  between  sourcing
trategies  and  productivity  which  is  not  fully  consistent  with
he  theoretical  model  of  global  sourcing  suggested  by  Antràs
nd  Helpman  (2004)  but  we  conﬁrm  many  partial  aspects  of
he  ranking  proposed  by  these  authors.  These  results  are  not
obust  neither  to  the  consideration  of  mixed  sourcing  strate-
ies  nor  to  the  inclusion  of  ﬁxed  effects  in  the  estimation.
ut,  we  argue  that  the  results  in  these  two  cases  should  be
iewed  with  some  caveats.
Regarding  the  analysis  of  the  direction  of  causality,  ﬁrst
e  offer  empirical  evidence  to  check  whether  the  advan-
age  of  offshoring  ﬁrms  (i.e.,  ﬁrms  that  outsource  their
nputs  abroad,  either  from  an  afﬁliated  or  a non-afﬁliated
rm)  is  consistent  with  the  selection  of  the  most  produc-
ive  ﬁrms  into  offshoring.  To  do  this,  we  observe  ten  cohorts
f  ﬁrms  in  the  transition  from  non-offshoring  to  offshoring
ver  the  period  1993--2002.  We  ﬁnd  some  weak  evidence  of
elf-selection  of  ﬁrms  into  offshoring.Second,  we  explore  a  second  type  of  effect  that  the  liter-
ture  on  offshoring  has  emphasized:  the  positive  impact  of
ffshoring  on  future  productivity.  Taking  the  sample  of  ﬁrms
ith  a  transition  from  the  domestic  market  to  the  foreign
anu
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market  in  their  sourcing  strategy  as  a  reference,  we  do  not
observe  any  change  in  the  trajectory  of  productivity  growth
after  the  decision  to  offshore  takes  place.  However,  there
exists  evidence  in  the  literature  supporting  the  relocation
hypothesis.  We  think  that  the  evidence  on  the  relocation
hypothesis  is  not  conclusive,  and  further  research  is  needed.
We  conclude  with  some  ﬁnal  remarks  on  policy  con-
siderations.  According  to  models  of  global  sourcing  the
productivity  distribution  of  ﬁrms  has  a  strong  inﬂuence
on  the  sorting  of  ﬁrms  in  their  sourcing  decisions.  As  the
productivity  and  the  size  distributions  of  ﬁrms  are  posi-
tively  and  intensely  associated,  the  size  characteristics  of
the  Spanish  manufacturing  sectors  will  also  inﬂuence  the
distribution  of  sourcing  strategies.  For  example,  Spain  is
one  of  the  EU  countries  with  a  higher  proportion  of  small
and  medium-sized  enterprises.  This  implies  that  the  Span-
ish  manufacturing  industry  should  show  a  preference  for
domestic  outsourcing  over  offshoring  and  for  international
outsourcing  over  foreign  integration  compared  to  other  EU
countries.  Government  policies  aimed  to  promote  small  and
medium-sized  enterprises  should  be  aware  that  they  might
have  a  signiﬁcant  inﬂuence  on  the  sourcing  decisions  by
ﬁrms.
In  a  world  of  global  sourcing,  ﬁrms  require  to  import  from
abroad  and  to  offshore  some  parts  of  their  value  chains
to  remain  competitive  both  in  the  domestic  and  interna-
tional  markets.  Current  industrial  policies,  as  in  the  EU  (see
European  Commission,  2012)  that  set  out  a  roadmap  for
reindustrialization,  should  take  this  into  account.  Industry-
speciﬁc  support  policies  might  have  no  role  to  play  in  a
world  where  ﬁrms  offshore  in  a  systematic  way.  Global
sourcing  challenges  the  common  policy  thinking  about  indus-
trial  policy  and  competitiveness.  From  this  point  of  view,
our  results  provide  valuable  insights  for  understanding  the
consequences  of  global  production  decisions  by  ﬁrms  at  an
aggregate  country  level.
Finally,  our  results  are  interesting  for  understanding
productivity.  In  this  sense,  we  ﬁnd  a  quite  systematic  rela-
tionship  between  sourcing  strategies  and  productivity  at  the
ﬁrm  level.  Although  we  are  not  so  successful  in  explaining
this  relationship.  We  ﬁnd  some  weak  evidence  of  self-
selection  and  no  inﬂuence  of  relocation  on  ﬁrm  productivity.
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Data appendix.
The  data  set  is  a  longitudinal  survey  of  Spanish  manufac-
turing  ﬁrms  that  comes  from  the  Encuesta  sobre  Estrategias
Empresariales  (ESEE),  collected  by  the  Fundación  Empresa
Pública  and  sponsored  by  the  Spanish  Ministry  of  Industry.
This  data  set  contains  a  longitudinal  sample  of  ﬁrms  from
1990  to  2005.  The  deﬁnition  of  the  variables  used  in  the
analysis  is  as  follows:
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 Age: computed  as  the  difference  between  the  calendar
year  at  t  and  the  birth-year  reported  by  the  ﬁrm.
 Capital  input: net  capital  stock  at  current  replacement
value  calculated  from  an  initial  estimate  of  the  capital
stock  according  to  the  perpetual  inventory  formula  for
each  ﬁrm:
it =  Iit +  Kit−1(1  −  dit) Pt
Pt−1
here  Iit corresponds  to  the  value  of  investment  in  equip-
ent  of  ﬁrm  i  at  time  t,  dit stands  for  depreciation  rates,
nd  Pt is  an  aggregate  price  index  for  equipment  invest-
ent  published  by  the  Spanish  Institute  of  Statistics.  The
nitial  value  of  capital  stock  is  estimated  considering  the
ook  value  of  the  capital  stock  and  the  average  age  of  the
quipment.  Replacement  values  of  the  capital  equipment
re  expressed  in  real  terms.  Depreciation  rates  are  com-
uted  at  the  industry  level  from  information  on  assets  life
ublished  by  the  Spanish  Ministry  of  Industry.
 Foreign  ownership: dummy  variable  indicating  that  for-
eign  ownership  is  50%  or  more  of  total  equity.
 Intermediate  input: measured  by  the  cost  of  intermediate
inputs,  which  includes  raw  materials  purchases,  energy
and  fuel  costs  and  other  services  paid  for  by  the  ﬁrm.
Intermediate  inputs  are  expressed  in  real  terms  using  indi-
vidual  price  indexes  of  intermediate  inputs  reported  by
the  ﬁrm.
 Labour  input: measured  by  the  number  of  effective  hours
of  work  per  year,  which  is  equal  to  normal  hours  plus
overtime  hours  minus  non-working  hours.
 Output:  measured  by  the  annual  value  of  gross  production
of  goods  and  services  expressed  in  real  terms  using  price
indexes  for  each  ﬁrm  reported  by  the  ESEE.
 Size: log  of  employment  deﬁned  by  the  average  number
of  workers.
 Subcontracted  purchases  of  intermediate  inputs: the  pro-
cedure  to  calculate  the  values  of  domestic  outsourcing
(DO),  foreign  outsourcing  (FO)  and  foreign  integration  (FI)
can  be  summarized  as  follows:  ﬁrms  report  the  value  of
purchases  of  elaborated  products  and  customized  compo-
nents  subcontracted  to  external  suppliers.  We  consider
the  value  of  these  purchases  to  be  equal  to  the  three
following  components:  the  total  amount  of  intermediate
inputs  outsourced  by  the  ﬁrm  in  the  domestic  market  (DO),
the  amount  of  purchases  outsourced  abroad  (FO)  and  the
quantity  integrated  abroad  (FI).
The  ﬁrm  reports  a  second  piece  of  information,  which  is
he  value  of  customized  intermediate  imports  coming  from
fﬁliated  companies  located  in  a foreign  market.  We  identify
his  amount  reported  by  the  ﬁrm  as  the  amount  of  foreign
ntegration  (FI).
We  still  have  to  split  the  remaining  purchases  of  elabo-
ated  products  and  customized  components  into  domestic
utsourcing  (DO)  and  foreign  outsourcing  (FO).  To  this  end,
e  assume  that  the  distribution  of  subcontracted  purchases
t  the  ﬁrm  level  between  the  domestic  market  (DO)  and  the
oreign  market  (FO  +  FI)  is  equal  to  the  distribution  of  total
1p
t
t
o
o
R
A
A
A
A
B
C
C
D
D
E
F
F
F
F
F
F
G
G
G
G
H
H
I
K
M
M
O
O
O
Analysis, Licos Discussion Paper Series, 287/2011.06  
urchases  of  intermediate  inputs  between  the  domestic  and
he  foreign  market  for  each  ﬁrm.  So  far,  we  have  identiﬁed
he  amount  of  domestic  outsourcing  (DO)  and  the  amount
f  foreign  integration  (FI).  Now  the  identiﬁcation  of  foreign
utsourcing  (FO)  is  straightforward.
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